Archer et al. (IEEE cost)
The Cost of IEEE Arithmetic in Secure Computation
Approach
exact-ieee754
Notes
The origin of the double-precision gate counts that ZIP and ZKLP both quote, and which the zkML literature leans on when it calls floats "infeasible". MPC rather than ZK, but it is where the numbers come from, so it is worth pinning down. PRIMARY TABLE (Sec 3, IEEE-754-compliant FP64 circuits, compiled via CBMC-GC to Bristol Fashion, OR gates removed so only AND/XOR/INV remain): add: 5,385 AND | 8,190 XOR | 2,062 INV | AND-depth 235 mul: 19,626 AND | 21,947 XOR | 3,326 INV | AND-depth 129 div: 82,269 AND | 84,151 XOR | 17,587 INV | AND-depth 3,619 PROVENANCE NOTE, verified by us: the figures "15,637 add / 44,899 mul" quoted by ZIP and by ZKLP are the TOTAL gate counts, i.e. AND+XOR+INV summed from the rows above (5385+8190+2062 = 15,637; 19626+21947+3326 = 44,899). Both secondhand quotes are arithmetically correct. But the total is a generous way to state the cost: in most MPC/ZK settings the AND gates dominate (XOR is often free), so the AND-only cost is 5,385 / 19,626 -- roughly 3x and 2x smaller. Archer et al. go further and say that for their LSSS-based engine "the dominant cost is not the number of AND gates but the DEPTH of the AND gates". So when the zkML literature cites ~45k gates for an FP64 multiply as evidence that floats are hopeless, it is citing the largest of several defensible numbers, transplanted from MPC into a ZK argument. That does not make the conclusion wrong -- 19,626 AND gates is still enormous next to a field multiply -- but the figure deserves the asterisk.
Our reading
What is new
The first careful measurement of what IEEE-754 compliance actually costs in secure computation, set against the two real-number approximations the MPC world had settled on instead: Catrina–Saxena fixed point, and MPC "floating point" (which is not IEEE floating point). The authors compile IEEE-compliant double-precision addition, multiplication and division to Boolean circuits, run them under binary-circuit MPC, run the LSSS-based approximations under Scale-Mamba, and compare.
The paper's importance to this SoK is entirely secondhand: it is where the double-precision gate counts come from. When ZIP argues that hardcoding IEEE-754 into a circuit is hopeless, and when ZKLP tabulates the naive-emulation baseline it beats, both are quoting Archer. It is upstream of the numerics argument in the verifiability column, and almost nobody who cites it has read it.
Its own conclusion is not the one it gets cited for:
We compare the relative performance, and conclude that the addition cost of IEEE compliance maybe too great for some applications. Thus in the secure domain standards bodies may wish to examine a different form of real number approximations.
Archer et al. · Abstract
That is not "use fixed point." That is "the secure-computing community should go and design a better real-number standard," which is a live research call and not a settled verdict.
What it actually proves
Nothing, it is MPC, and it produces no proof. There is no prover, no verifier, no soundness argument; the string "zero-knowledge" does not appear anywhere in the paper.
What it measures is gate counts and wall-clock for three IEEE-754 double-precision operations under
binary-circuit MPC (garbled circuits, and Q2-access-structure LSSS modulo 2), against
arithmetic-circuit MPC over F_p for the approximations. Its headline table gives AND, XOR and
INV counts, plus AND-depth, for add, mul and div.
What to distrust
Not the paper. The paper is careful, honest and says exactly what it measured. What deserves suspicion is how the verifiability column quotes it, and there are two distinct problems.
One: the cost model does not transfer, and Archer says so. These are gate counts for Boolean circuits under MPC. In that setting XOR is often free and the real cost is depth, which the authors state outright:
since when operating in the Q2-domain using an LSSS-based MPC engine modulo 2 the dominant cost is not the number of AND gates but the depth of the AND gates in the circuit.
So even inside its own paper, the gate count is not the figure of merit. Transplanting a total gate
count from garbled-circuit MPC into a claim about SNARK constraint counts, a completely different
arithmetization, with a completely different cost model, over a large prime field rather than F_2,
is a category error. The conclusion it is used to support (floats are expensive in a circuit) may well
be right; this is simply not evidence for it in the form it is being used.
Two: the number that gets quoted is the largest of several defensible ones. The figures that
ZIP and ZKLP both reproduce for FP64 are the AND + XOR + INV totals, summed across the
rows of Archer's table. Both secondhand quotes are arithmetically correct, we checked, and
papers.yml records the derivation. But the AND-only cost, which is what most MPC and ZK settings
actually pay for, is a few times smaller; and by Archer's own argument neither is the right metric
for their engine.
So when the zkML literature cites a five-figure gate count for a double-precision multiply as proof that floating point is hopeless, it is citing the largest of several defensible numbers, from a cost model that does not apply, in support of a conclusion the source paper does not draw. The conclusion may survive all of that, a few thousand AND gates is still enormous beside a field multiply, and nothing here threatens sum-check on integer matmuls. But the figure deserves its asterisk, and it has never been given one.
What Archer actually asked for, nobody built
Archer's closing recommendation is that standards bodies design a real-number approximation tailored to the secure domain, rather than importing IEEE-754 wholesale or falling back on ad-hoc fixed point.
Read the numerics cluster as a set of uncoordinated answers to that call. Garg et al. (FP) relaxes the semantics to a relative-error model. ZKLP keeps IEEE and moves the hard parts into lookups. Range-Arithmetic keeps fixed point and proves the rounding arithmetically. SecFloat rebuilds the operations from crypto-friendly integer primitives. Four incompatible proposals, in two literatures that do not cite each other, and no standard.
Citation neighbourhood
Builds on
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